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INSOLVENCY IN BANKRUPTCY: A SYNTHESIS
G. STANLEY JOSLINt
Insolvency as now generally defined in our Bankruptcy Act came
into being in 1898.' Section 1(19) of the Bankruptcy Act provides
that a person shall be deemed insolvent "whenever the aggregate of his
property . . . shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to
pay his debts."2 Before this creation of 1898 the common law,3 equity4
and traders,5 defined insolvency as an inability to pay debts as they ma-
ture, or words of simpler import. Since that definition prescribed by
the Bankruptcy Act, the world outside of bankruptcy has largely ignored
this divergence and has continued the original meaning without apologies,
as evidenced by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,' the Uniform
Sales Act' and the Uniform Commercial Code.' All of these include in
their definition of insolvency an inability to pay debts as they become
due. The Bankruptcy Act itself found a greater use for the status of
insolvency as a determinative factor and so finds its sections monot-
onously repetitive of the provision "insolvent or inability to pay debts as
they mature."'  To be sure, its own restrictive definition is alone ap-
plicable in certain instances,"0 but whether that is desirable is question-
able. At least, the complete abandonment of the "liabilities exceeding
assets" concept of insolvency would work no havoc.
Because at the present time the two concepts, i.e., the balancing of
t Candler Professor of Law, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, member of the
United States Conference Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
1. COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 1.19(1) (14th ed. 1960).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958).
3. GLENN, CRDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 370 (1915).
4. Finn v. Meigham, 325 U.S. 300, 303 (1944) ; Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 98 F.
Supp. 807, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd. in part and rev'd. in part on other grounds 196
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1952), opinion supplemented on otier grounds 201 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.
1953) cert. dismissed 346 U.S. 863 (1953).
5. 4 REMINGToN, BANKRUPTCY § 1686 (6th ed. Henderson 1955).
6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcE ACT § 2.
7. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76(3).
8. UNIFOPM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(23). It should be noted that the Code
includes in its definition of insolvency the words "within the meaning of the federal
bankruptcy law." Ibid.
9. E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 3(a) (5), (d), 75(c), 77, 83, 115, 130(1), 323, 423,
623, 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)(5), (d), 203(c), 205, 403, 515, 530(1), 723, 823, 1023 (1958).
10. E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 3(a) (3), (c), 5(b), (k), 19, 60(a) (1), (b), 67(a) (1),
(c), 137, 179, 216(8), 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)(3), (c), 23(b), (k), 42, 96(a)(1), (b),
107(a) (1), (c), 537, 579, 616(8) (1958). The special fraudulent conveyance section
of the Bankruptcy Act contains its own distinctive definition of insolvency. Bankruptcy
Act § 67(d)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1) (1958).
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assets against liabilities and the ability to pay debts, are very important
stati in determining substantive and procedural rights in bankruptcy and
because of the frequent requirement that one or the other of the stati be
found to exist, it seems desirable that each concept be designated with
a single surname so that they may be quickly and concisely distinguished
without the confusing jargon so often encountered wherein the terms
insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, or in the common law sense, or as
understood by merchants, or in the equity sense, or by the "balance
sheet" test, are indiscriminately bantered about. Therefore, the follow-
ing names will be used to express these general concepts, and they will
be used hereafter: (1) Balance Insolvency: that status wherein the debts
exceed the value of property; (2) Inability Insolvency: that status
wherein one is unable to pay his debts as they mature. Certainly there
are subordinate problems, such as a determination of what property may
be counted in computing the balance, and the weight to be given an actual
default on a due obligation as determinative of inability, yet the area it-
self is unmistakably delineated by these names and discussion may pro-
ceed with assurance of clarity.
THE QUESTION OF RE-DEFINING
The present balance insolvency concept, created over sixty years ago
and firmly entrenched in the thinking of the bankruptcy practitioners
and those engaged in its administration, could not and should not be
changed except as part of a general and far-reaching revision of the
Bankruptcy Act. In such event, however, it is suggested that one of
two alternatives could be the basis for change. Either of these would be
desirable, but one more far-reaching in its scope than the other. First:
If both balance insolvency and inability insolvency are to be used as an
alternate status for determining a matter, with their present frequency
in the Bankruptcy Act, the definition of section 1 (19) should be changed
to include both. Thus it would not be necessary to continually restate
the words "insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature," as the
word insolvent would encompass both. If in certain sections of the act it
is desirable to continue a single economic status as the base for deter-
mination, that single status should be set out in the section of the act
wherein it is to be applied, and in these sections the particular type of in-
solvency desired would be stated as applying to that particular situation.
Again the suggestion here is not that this change in the Bankruptcy Act
wording be made as a piecework amendment, but that these changes be
considered if the whole Bankruptcy Act is revised and if the present
concepts of insolvency be continued in the new act.
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Second: It is contended that there should be only one base for in-
solvency used in the Bankruptcy Act and that should be "inability in-
solvency." Or, in other words, the use of "balance insolvency" should
be completely abandoned and omitted from the Bankruptcy Act. Not
only do these varying concepts of insolvency assert themselves in myriad
places in the present act,"1 but they also have inconsistent play on the
same problem. For example, under section 3(a) (5) inability insolvency
may be the basis for an act of bankruptcy and under section 3 (c) balance
insolvency proved as a defense,12 or under sections 130, 131 (5) and 133,
where a stockholder is attempting to answer a petition under chapter X, 8
it may be necessary to prove balance insolvency after inability insolvency
has been established. Unless a justifiable need can be shown for retain-
ing balance insolvency as an economic status for determining rights in
bankruptcy it should be abandoned, leaving inability insolvency as the
sole determinative status. If this be the conclusion, the definition section
of the act would be changed to define insolvency as the inability to pay
debts as they mature and the balance concept omitted.
ASSETS IN BALANCE INSOLVENCY
Although it is normally not difficult to determine the assets which
may be congeried when determining whether the aggregate of property
shall be sufficient to pay debts, there are cryptic provisions in the Bank-
ruptcy Act which present unsuspected variations in this area. The act
states generally that the aggregate property, exclusive of that fraudu-
lently conveyed, shall be the basis for determining insolvency. Thus, the
act excludes from the balance computation any property which may have
been conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be con-
cealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay creditors. 4
No exclusive reference is made concerning exempt property and there
being no other section defining "property," exempt property is in-
cluded in the assets to be fairly evaluated in determining insolvency. It
seems that this question might be reconsidered, as the creditors could be
in a totally inadequate position and yet not be able to show insolvency.
Apart from the general definition of insolvency in section 1(19)
of the act, however, there are provisions in the act which, in specific
instances, result in a different asset base to be used in determining sol-
vency, and which also indirectly bring into play outside controls which
11. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
12. Bankruptcy Act §§ 3(a) (5), (c), 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a) (5), (c) (1958).
13. Bankruptcy Act §§ 130, 131(5), 133, 11 U.S.C. §§ 530, 531(5), 533 (1958).
14. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958).
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have their own particular rules governing assets that may be included in
this computation. Thus, for the specific purposes of determining fraud-
ulent transfers which may be avoided if made within a year prior to the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy, as specified in Section 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act, exempt property is not to be counted in the computa-
tion to determine solvency."5 Furthermore, an indirect asset base may
be interjected into bankruptcy computations whenever insolvency as de-
termined under state law is made relevant. Thus, a transfer which is
fraudulent under any state law is null and void as against the trustee."
This brings into consideration by the bankruptcy court the treatment of
insolvency extended by the applicable state law and that law will deter-
mine the assets which will be considered in determining balance insol-
vency. If the state, for example, has the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act and the trustee is attempting to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance under section 4 of that act, which section makes voidable certain
transfers by one "who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent," he must
prove the insolvency defined in the Uniform Act. Under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, exempt assets are not included in the com-
putation to determine fair value for insolvency purposes." It is very
possible, then, that in the course of a bankruptcy, several different bal-
ance insolvencies will be required to be proved and each with a different
asset computation. An act of bankruptcy under section 3(a) (3) re-
quires a balancing which includes exempt property in the assets but ex-
cludes property fraudulently conveyed,"8 while later in the same proceed-
ing it may be necessary to prove insolvency wherein exempt property may
not be included in the computation but fraudulently conveyed property
will be included.'9 Any generalization, then, as to the assets which will
be included in determining insolvency in a bankruptcy proceeding is im-
possible.
When insolvency becomes an issue in partnership bankruptcy the
asset computation may become quite difficult, especially if the partners
live in several states and the varying laws of those states become applic-
able. In cases where the petition is involuntary,2" or where the voluntary
petition is filed in behalf of the partnership by fewer than all of the
15. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1958). The proposed amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act would change § 1(19) to exclude exempt property in
determining solvency. See Proposed Amendments to Section of the Bankruptcy Act
Relating to Partnership Administration, 34 REF. J. 87 (1960).
16. Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1958).
17. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT §§ 1-2.
18. Bankruptcy Act § 3(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (1958).
19. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1958).
20. See Bankruptcy Act § 3(b), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1958).
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general partners,2' the issue of balance insolvency becomes pertinent.
Although there has been some inconsistency in the past, it is generally
accepted now that a determination of insolvency requires the compilation
of both the assets of the firm and the personal assets of the general part-
ners.22 There has been considerable criticism of this inclusion of the
partners' assets in determining partnership insolvency, and strong senti-
ment favors balancing only the property of the partnership against the
partnership obligations.23 Professor Kennedy, however, after a careful
consideration of the whole problem of insolvency in partnership bank-
ruptcies, concludes that to determine the solvency of a partnership the
separate property of the general partners should be excluded unless the
partnership could prove that the separate non-exempt property of the
general partners was sufficient to pay the separate debts and any defi-
ciency in the partnership assets.24 Under this proposal the determination
of insolvency would be expedited as the initial insolvency could be quickly
shown on partnership records, and the burden of showing assets available
for all creditors would be on those who have that information.
The question of asset balance insolvency in partnership bankruptcies
also may arise under the fraudulent conveyance section of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, Section 67(d) where there is a singular definition of in-
solvency,2  or may arise under section 70(e)(1) wherein the relevant
state laws on insolvency may become applicable, as discussed herein
above.
LIABILITIES IN BALANCE INSOLVENCY
In determining balance status for insolvency purposes the liability
side must also be congeried. The provision "aggregate of debts," in
Section 1(19) of the Bankruptcy Act27 is more specifically defined as
including "any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy."28  Al-
though this is the background upon which most computable liabilities are
21. See Bankruptcy Act § 5(b), 11 U.S.C. § 23(b) (1958).
22. See COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 5.03, at 106 (2d ed. Edelman 1961).
23. See Kennedy, A New Deal or Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUm. L. REv.
610, 612 (1960).
24. Id. at 652-53.
25. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1958).
26. Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1958).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958). An initial problem may
arise as to whether a relationship is one comprising an asset or a liability. In Hoppe v.
Rittenhouse, 279 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1960), an enforceable agreement to exchange notes
held against a corporation for stock converted the relationship to one of subscriptions
to stock, thus resulting in an asset rather than a debt.
28. Bankruptcy Act § 1(14), 11 U.S.C. § 1(14) (1958). Note that certain claims
arising after the petition under chapter X, which deals with corporate reorganizations
are provable. Bankruptcy Act § 201, 11 U.S.C. § 601 (1958).
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determined in bankruptcy, the same problems are presented as are
encountered in determining assets which will be permissible in computa-
tion. For specific purposes the Bankruptcy Act requires the liability
side to be computed from a broader background, requiring the inclusion
of liabilities not recognizable under the more generally applicable liability
base. Thus, as in computing the asset balance, the Bankruptcy Act im-
poses a different liability base in the area of fraudulent conveyances.
Section 67(d) (1) (b) defines "debt" as "any legal liability, whether
matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or
contingent."' The inclusion of tort and contingent claims in this classi-
fication results in a significant broadening of the liability base."0 Like-
wise, section 70(e) (1) of the act may bring into consideration a basic
determination of insolvency under state law when a fraudulent convey-
ance is asserted under that law."
In this liability context the merry-go-round, provable-not allow-
able-not provable concept comes to mind. Contingent debts and con-
tingent contractual liabilities are provable,82 but they may be disallowed
if no reasonable estimation can be made."3 If such is the case, the claims,
once provable, are rendered not provable.8 4 It is established that prov-
able claims are to be compiled to determine the liability side. 5 The next
question is whether a provable claim which is not allowable and so not
provable ends up in or out of the liability compilation for insolvency
purposes. The need for this circuitous provable-not provable-meta-
morphosis arises out of the desire to avoid the delay of the judicious
handling of the bankrupt's estate caused by the extreme uncertainty of
the dollar value of certain liabilities. In view of this fact, it seems that
such claims should not be considered when the question of balance sol-
vency is in issue. It does seem, however, that because the question of
insolvency may be the initial determinative factor upon which jurisdic-
tion in bankruptcy itself depends,"0 and because the entire proceeding
will be held up until the solvency issue is determined, the decision to in-
clude the contingent claim as a liability or exclude it as not provable
29. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (1) (b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1) (b) (1958). Note
that the liability base for balance insolvency may change throughout the several com-
partments of the bankruptcy law, as in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act where the
definitive section redefines claims, creditors and debts for its own purposes. Bankruptcy
Act §§ 102, 106(1), (4), (5), 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506(1), (4) (5) (1958).
30. See COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY MANUAL ff 67.27(2), at 872 (2d ed. Edelman 1961).
31. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1958).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (8), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (8) (1958).
33. Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1958).
34. Bankruptcy Act § 63(d), 11 U.S.C. § 103(d) (1958).
35. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(19), 1(14), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(19), 1(14) (1958).
36. See Bankruptcy Act § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
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should be limited strictly to the one purpose of solvency determination
so that at a later time when claims can be more carefully analyzed, the
issue of provability and allowability may be reconsidered for purposes
of participation in the distribution and discharge.
An improbable but interesting problem in regard to liabilities in
balance insolvency may arise as a result of Section 63(a) (9) of the
Bankruptcy Act, which provides that certain real estate lease claims are
limited in their allowability to one year's rent." Since the entire claim
on these unexpired leases of real property is provable,3" it seems that this
total claim would be computed in determining a question of balance in-
solvency. 9 Moreover this shift from full provability to fractional al-
lowability is not doubled back to remove the provability status as is the
provable contingent claim which is disallowed and thus rendered non-
provable."0 It is possible, then, that a debtor insolvent when the provable
real estate lease claim is included in the balance computation would be
solvent if the allowable lease claim were used in the computation. Cer-
tainly the provability of the entire real estate lease claim should continue
for purposes of dischargeability, but should its full weight be taken into
count when the question of balance insolvency is in issue? For example:
If the assets total $150,000 and the liabilities, not including the lease
claims, total $140,000 and the entire breach of lease claim is $15,000, the
debtor is clearly insolvent, but if the allowable annual rent of $4,000 is
used as a basis, the debtor is clearly solvent. This problem would be ac-
centuated in a situation where a debtor is trying to ward off bankruptcy
by proving he was solvent at the crucial times, when insolvency consti-
tutes an element of an act of bankruptcy,41 or by asserting as a defense
solvency at the time of the filing of the petition."
The solution of this question as to whether the provable claim for
real estate leases or the allowable claim of one year's rent should be
used in computing balance insolvency may require the classification of
the creditors into real estate lease claim creditors and other creditors. If
the real estate leases are not in default, it seems that the other creditors
should not be permitted to force an adjudication of bankruptcy by in-
cluding the entire provable real estate lease claim as a liability in the
balance computation. On the other hand, if the real estate leases are in
37. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1958). Under chapter
X reorganizations the three year provision on real estate leases may raise this problem.
Bankruptcy Act § 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1958).
38. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a) (9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1958).
39. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(19), 1(14), 11 U.S.C. §§1(19), 1(14) (1958).
40. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 57(d), 63(d), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(d), 103(d) (1958).
41. See Bankruptcy Act § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
42. See Bankruptcy Act § 3(c), 11 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1958).
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default and only the allowable one year's rent is recognized in determin-
ing balance insolvency, the debtor may befound solvent and, unless he
returned to bankruptcy on a voluntary basis, turned out to state law
treatment where the total real estate rent claim would be recognized, with
its disastrous results on the debtor and the other creditors. It seems that
under its broad, equitable power,4" a bankruptcy court could refuse to use
the total provable real estate lease claim, and use the allowable year's rent
when determining balance insolvency, and that when the pressure is com-
ing only from non real estate lease creditors and there is no imminence
of breach of lease except that which would result from the bankruptcy,
this computation should be used. This whole problem, of course, would
be resolved by an abandonment of the balance insolvency concept in bank-
ruptcy and a shift to the exclusive use of the "ability to pay as they ma-
ture" concept.
JuRY DETERMINATION OF SOLVENCY
The function of jury trials in bankruptcy proceedings has not been
complicated or challenged for many years. The person against whom
an involuntary petition has been filed is entitled to a jury trial on the
questions of solvency and of the commission of an act of bankruptcy. 4
This, then, not only makes a jury issue of balance insolvency, if properly
requested by the bankrupt, but also may bring up an issue of inability
insolvency as a concomitant to the issue of whether an act of bankruptcy
has been committed." Thus, if the jury issue is whether a person has,
while insolvent or unable to pay his debts, procured the appointment of
a receiver, which is an act of bankruptcy, the jury may have as an ele-
ment for determination the question of inability to pay debts.4" Further-
more, the whole realm of variant and inconsistent economic concepts, in-
cluding state law, from which insolvency is determined may be thrown
into the lap of the jury if called upon to determine whether an act of
bankruptcy consisting of a fraudulent conveyance has occurred." It is
entirely possible, then, that a jury would be called upon to determine the
existence of balance insolvency, inability insolvency or several different
types of each in determining the single issue of whether an act of bank-
ruptcy has been committed and whether the bankruptcy may proceed.'"
A much heavier responsibility may fall to the jury in its seemingly nar-
43. See Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1958).
44. Bankruptcy Act § 19(a), 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1958).
45. Ibid.
46. See Bankruptcy Act § 3(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1958).
47. See Bankruptcy Act § 3(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. 2 21(a)(1) (1958).
48. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 3(a) (1), (c), 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)(1), (c) (1958).
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row field of function than is first casually observed. If the right to have
these matters of solvency determined by the jury is not asserted, the
question will normally be determined by the court, but the court may sub-
mit questions of insolvency to the jury on an advisory basis.49 In cases
where there is no right to a jury, questions of fact on insolvency may be
submitted by the court to a jury."
The right of a person against whom an involuntary petition has
been filed to a jury trial in respect to the question of his insolvency may
be lost in an obscure and circuitous manner.' A corporation which files
a voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter X 2 thereupon sub-
jects itself to all the authority of that chapter, and thus under section
236(2) the matter may be adjudged one for strict bankruptcy and the
proceeding may continue under the general provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 3 It has been held by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that when the matter is sent down for basic bankruptcy continua-
tion, even though the debtor objects, he is not entitled to raise the issue
of insolvency, nor to a jury determination of the issue, on the grounds
that he is deemed to have entered bankruptcy through the chapter X door
and he has no basis for demanding the rights he would have had if
forced in through another." As a practical matter, then, it may be said
that a voluntary entrance into one sphere of bankruptcy, after which a
reference is made to another, continues its voluntary status although the
reference is contended. A strange result may be hypotheticated in a situa-
tion where the voluntary petitioner enters under chapter X on the
grounds of inability insolvency and then is dragged against his will into
straight bankruptcy, where he is not then entitled to raise the question of
balance solvency and a jury determination. The court, it is suggested,
was correct in its holding if it is assumed that when one seeks relief in
bankruptcy, he is asking for the matter to be handled in the most ef-
ficient manner, and the court will properly determine that area of bank-
ruptcy which will most effectively proceed with the particular debtor's
estate.
Because the issues most likely to be basic elements for proof in
jury trials are issues of insolvency of one kind or another, the question
as to whether the referee may conduct a jury trial becomes pertinent to a
49. See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUP CY 1 19.04, at 227 (14th ed. 1960).
50. Id. at 226.
51. See In re Aqua Hotel Corp., 251 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 356 U.S.
965 (1958), rehcaring denied 357 U.S. 944 (1958).
52. See Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1958).
53. Bankruptcy Act § 236(2), 11 U.S.C. 636(2) (1958).
54. In re Aqua Hotel Corp., supra note 51.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
consideration of insolvency. The practice has developed, without being
given" much thought, wherein the judge conducts necessary jury trials.
Eminent authorities have categorically stated without citation that "A
jury trial is conducted by the judge, not by the referee."" Recently,
however, several jury trials have been conducted by referees and the
matter has thus come forceably to attention."6 The Judicial Conference
has frowned upon this practice and has referred the matter to the Ad-
visory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules for consideration. 7 It is doubt-
ful that the referees would welcome the added burden of conducting jury
trials but it does appear that there is no mandate in bankruptcy law re-
quiring the conduct of jury trials on bankruptcy issues such as solvency
to be conducted by the judge. The present status of the matter is, un-
certain but in all probability jury trials will no longer be conducted by the
referee unless some clarifying authority approving the practice is handed
down.
PROvING INSOLVENCY
Most of the acts of bankruptcy which provide the justification for
creditors forcing a debtor into bankruptcy have elements of either bal-
ance or inability insolvency,"8 and the burden is upon the creditors to
prove that status. In addition, when a trustee takes affirmative action
to set aside fraudulent conveyances,59 preferences," or judicial liens,"'
the burden is upon him to establish insolvency when it is in issue. The
elementary principles of burden of proof apply to these and other situa-
tions where insolvency is an issue and are not meant to be treated here.
However, certain shiftings of the normal burden must be noted, as well
as the possibility of the application of foreign governing patterns.
Although the burden is upon the creditor to establish insolvency
when it is an element of an act of bankruptcy, the fact of solvency if put
as a matter of defense to a proceeding under the first act of bankruptcy
must be asserted and the burden of proof carried by the alleged bank-
rupt. 2 To aid the creditors in carrying the burden of proof of insol-
vency when in issue within the second (preferential transfer), third
55. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1 19, at 262 (2d ed. Edelman 1961). There is
no such statement in COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1960).
56. See It re Eastern Supply Co., 197 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Pa. 1961) ; News and
Editorial Comment, 34 REF. J. 34 (1960).
57. Reporter's Memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules,
Nov. 26, 1960.
58. See Bankruptcy Act § 3, 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
59. See Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1958).
60. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958).
61. See Bankruptcy Act § 67(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1958).
62. Bankruptcy Act § 3(c), 11 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1958).
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(judicial lien) or fifth (appointment of a receiver) acts of bankruptcy,
the debtor must give full cooperation by his appearance with books and
accounts and give testimony on the matter of his financial situation. If
he fails to give the necessary cooperation in this regard, insolvency will
be presumed, thus relieving the creditors of this burden. From this
point the burden of proving solvency rests on the debtor.63
If the issue of insolvency arises and is an essential element in the
recovery of preferences" or fraudulent conveyances,65 the burden is
logically on the trustee. This burden may be compounded by a require-
ment that not only insolvency at a time not formerly in issue be proven,
but that a reasonable cause to believe in the insolvency of the debtor be
shown.6" Moreover, a recalcitrant debtor cannot cause the burden to
shift to the transferee as he can shift the burden to himself on other
occasions. 7 Certainly a transferee who is charged with receiving a
preference avoidable by the trustee should not be charged with the un-
cooperative attitude of the bankrupt, and even though a preference is
established by a presumption of insolvency raised by this recalcitrance, it
should not be conclusive upon one charged with receiving a preference
unless he was a full party to the original determination. Although the
alleged preferential transferee should not be prejudiced by the attitude
of the debtor in his giving of information on his financial status, it does
not seem out of line, in establishing the necessary "reasonable cause to
believe" that insolvency existed,6" that a presumption of this reasonable
cause be raised when a debtor's records are confused, incomplete and
unintelligible and the transferee has full knowledge of that condition.
However, it has been held that the keeping of records in a "slovenly
manner" or "unbusiness like manner," even if known by the transferee,
does not establish the necessary reasonable cause.69
63. Bankruptcy Act § 3(d), 11 U.S.C. § 21(d) (1958).
64. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(a)(1), (b), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(1), (b) (1958).
65. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 67(a), (d), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(a), (d) (1958).
66. E.g., the basis for involuntary bankruptcy may be insolvency at the time of ajudicial lien under Bankruptcy Act § 3(a) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (3) (1958), while
the trustee in attempting to recover a preference must show insolvency at the time of
the transfer alleged to be a preference under Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (1), 11 U.S.C.
§ 96(a) (1) (1958), and reasonable cause to believe a debtor insolvent at the time of
the transfer under Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958). Note also the
necessity of proving knowledge or notice of insolvency in determining a proper set-off
or counterclaim. Bankruptcy Act § 68(b), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1958).
67. See Bankruptcy Act § 3(d), 11 U.S.C. § 21(d) (1958).
68. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958).
69. Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Ark. 1953). In the Dinkelspiel
case the court stated that although a transferee knew that checks were being dishonored,
this was the usual condition of the debtor and he was continuing to do his business in
his ordinary "unbusinesslike manner," and thus one might reasonably assume that the
debtor was merely short of ready cash, but that he was solvent. The court said further:
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When the issue as to solvency is between the involuntary bankrupt
and the petitioning creditors it would be justifiable to presume insolvency
whenever records are abstruse, inadequate or incomplete, even though the
debtor is unschooled and in good faith in his confusion. The contention
that unjustified failure to keep records from which a financial condition
and business transactions might be ascertained may result in a denial of
discharge and that this is sufficient penalty is not valid. Discharge or
no discharge is a crucial matter, whereas a shift of the burden of proof
seems a minor penalty for the debtor's original fault. As a result, there
are situations which merit a shift of the burden of proof but not a denial
of discharge.
A completely foreign basis for establishing the burden of proof may
be introduced in situations where, under state law, a preference or fraud-
ulent conveyance has occurred, and that law governs the substantive ele-
ments of proof in this insolvency area.70
TIME OF INSOLVENCY
The determination of the solvency of the debtor must relate to a par-
ticular point in time and this point is not necessarily the same in every
instance in which the law of bankruptcy deals with insolvency. Fre-
quently the crucial instant is the time of a particular transaction. Thus,
insolvency is in issue at the time of obtaining a judicial lien,7 ' the time
of the appointment of a receiver,"2 the time of a transfer challenged as
preferential,"' the time of an alleged fraudulent transfer,"' and the time
of a transfer asserted as a set-off or counter claim.7 In addition to the
basic issue of the time of the making of the transaction, the Bankruptcy
Act provides that in certain instances the time of the perfection of the
transaction is also a determinative point for computing the solvency
status."6 The point is also shifted by concrete definitions in the act of
the time at which certain transactions take place. Thus, in determining
the issue of solvency for the purpose of establishing a preference, a
"And, even if the defendant had knowledge of sufficient facts to put him upon inquiry,
such an inquiry would have gained him nothing. The state of Davis' books was such that
neither the defendant nor anyone else could have ascertained his financial condition
unless a complete audit was made, and even then the accuracy of the audit would be
doubtful." Id. at 463.
70. See Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1) (1958).
71. Bankruptcy Act §§ 3(a)(3), 67(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)(3), 107(a)(1)
(1958).
72. Bankruptcy Act § 3 (a) (5), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (5) (1958).
73. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1958).
74. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (2), (3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2), (3) (1958).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 68(b) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2) (1958).
76. Bankruptcy Act § 3(b), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1958).
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transfer of personal property is deemed to have been made when perfected
against a subsequent lien obtainable by judicial process,"7 while a transfer
of real property is made when perfected as against subsequent bona fide
purchasers."8 The freedom of the underlying state law in regard to the
perfection time pertaining to preferences is to some extent restricted by
the imposition in the Bankruptcy Act of a 21 day relation back period."9
Similar dates of transfer are defined for fraudulent conveyances."°
It may also be necessary to determine the solvency of the debtor at
the time of the filing of the petition. For example, the alleged bankrupt
may assert a complete defense to the first act of bankruptcy if he can
prove solvency at the time of the petition.8' In some instances the in-
solvency issue must be ascertained at a point of time after the comple-
tion of a transaction, such as instances wherein the Bankruptcy Act finds
certain transactions by a debtor "who is or will be thereby rendered in-
solvent . . ."2 to be fraudulent transfers.
Ordinarily, once the groundwork determining a basis for bankruptcy
has been laid, any change in the economic status of the bankrupt estate
will not remove the proceeding from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court as a matter of right," and therefore the question of solvency at a
point of time after the petition will not arise. An exception, however,
apparently exists in the set-off or counterclaim provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act." This section provides that a set-off or counterclaim which
was purchased by or transferred to a debtor of the bankrupt after the
filing of the petition with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was
insolvent shall not be allowed. 5 The question may be somewhat academic,
as the situation wherein a bankrupt becomes solvent after the filing of
the petition is extremely rare. However, the possibility exists, for ex-
ample, that affluent solvency would result during the first six months
of bankruptcy under the provisions of the act which vest in the trustee
bequests, devises or inheritance, contingent remainders or like interests
77. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (2) (1958).
78. Ibid.
79. See Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7) I, II, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7) I, II (1958).
80. See Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (5), 11 U.S.C. 107(d) (5) (1958).
81. Bankruptcy Act § 3(c), 11 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1958). See also Bankruptcy Act§§ 83, 130, 11 U.S.C. §§ 403, 530 (1958).
82. Bankruptcy Act §§ 67(d)(2), (3), (4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(d)(2), (3), (4)
(1958).
83. E. L. "Bunch" Hullet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 259 F.2d 685
(10th Cir. 1958).
84. See Bankruptcy Act § 68(b) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2) (1958).
85. Ibid. MacLachlan argues that the qualification concerning knowledge or notice
does not apply to assignments after the petition. MfAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 290, at
341, n. 7 (1956). Collier, however, treats the knowledge of insolvency as applicable to a
transfer after the petition. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 68.12, at 763 (14th ed. 1960).
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in property which vest or become assignable within that period.8" At
any rate, the purpose here is not to discuss the general set-off question
in this situation, but to present the possibility that the time at which sol-
vency is required to be ascertained may be a point of time after the
petition is filed.
POTPOURRI
In synthesizing insolvency's myriad contacts with bankruptcy, some
interesting minor problems suggest themselves. The Bankruptcy Act
provides that the court shall grant a discharge unless satisfied that the
bankrupt "has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or de-
ficiency of assets to meet liabilities. . . . "" The words "deficiency of
assets to meet his liabilities" have been characterized as "insolvency" and
the problem analyzed as such,8" but no reference is made in the provision
to "insolvency" as such. 9 It is arguable, therefore, that the term as de-
fined in the Bankruptcy Act does not govern the problem presented
here." The troublesome problem again may arise as to what assets and
liabilities are to be included in the computation under the "deficiency of
assets to meet his liabilities" provision. Should, for example, exempt
property or fraudulently transferred property be included in this com-
putation? On the other hand, the ease with which the cognomen of in-
solvency has attached to this problem suggests the acceptance of the
bankruptcy definition as controlling. If such is the case, clarity would
result in a rewording which would use the word insolvency in the place of
"deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities."
Another interesting but obscure problem concerning insolvency
arises under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. A petition for corporate
reorganization under this chapter, whether voluntary or involuntary,
must state that the corporation is insolvent (balance insolvency) or un-
able to pay its debts as they mature (inability insolvency)." However,
no stockholder may controvert the allegations of a petition unless the
debtor is solvent (balance insolvency).92 If the basis for the petition is
balance insolvency, and it is raised by the stockholder, both issues are
determined together, i.e., the right to object and the right to relief under
86. See Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
87. Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (7), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (7) (1958).
88. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 14.60, at 1435 (14th ed. 1960); MAcLACHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY § 106, at 96 (1956); Herzog, Failure to Satisfactorily Explain Loss of
Assets or Deficiency of Assets to Meet Liabilities, 34 REF. J. 100, 101 (1960).
89. Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (7), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (7) (1958).
90. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958).
91. Bankruptcy Act §3 130, 131, 11 U.S.C. §§ 530, 531 (1958).
92. Bankruptcy Act § 137, 11 U.S.C. § 537 (1958).
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chapter X. But if the basis for the petition is inability insolvency,
balance solvency must first be shown to enable the stockholders to con-
trovert the petition." The logic here is not challenged, as it is evident
that stockholders should have little to do with corporations in a balance
insolvency condition. In this regard it is also of interest to note that
stockholders share in the acceptance of a plan for reorganization if the
debtor has not been found insolvent,94 and that plan must provide for
stockholders except when the debtor is insolvent."
SUGGESTED CHANGES
Several major changes in the insolvency provisions have been sug-
gested in recent years. Professor Kennedy suggests that exempt prop-
erty be excluded in the balance computation and that a special provision
relating only to partnerships be added.99 Professor MacLachlan suggests
a sweeping change in the area of involuntary proceedings. He sets forth
a carefully drafted proposal which would abolish the use of balance in-
solvency in this area and apply only the inability concept. He then sets
forth a detailed itemization of situations which are to be conclusive evi-
dence of such inability.9" This would be a step in the direction of the
simplification and conciseness needed in an over-all appraisal of the
insolvency problem.
Although a generalized change in the insolvency definition could not
be made without a careful analysis to ascertain its effect upon the many
points of reference in the act, an over-all shift to the concept of inability
insolvency and the discontinuance of the use of the balance insolvency
concept, except in special areas, would be desirable. Inability insolvency
can be more quickly and easily established since it is free from the diffi-
cult and time consuming asset and liability computations. This in-
creased efficiency would prevent the rapid deterioration of the position
of the bankrupt, which is likely to occur during a slow and difficult
determination of solvency.
93. It was the intent of Congress to restrict the stockholder's right to answer
the petition to those cases in which the petition is based upon inability insolvency, but
not to authorize an answer where the petition is properly founded on balance insolvency.
See In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 138 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
94. Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. §579 (1958).
95. Bankruptcy Act § 216(8), 11 U.S.C. § 616(8) (1958).
96. Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 610,
652 (1960).
97. MAcLACHLAN, BANiRUpTcY 436 (1956).
